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9Metaphor
andScience
In the past thirty years, philosophers of science, philosophers of 
language, and cognitive scientists have emphasized the impor-
tance of understanding metaphor, although they rarely agree on 
the role it plays in thought. One dominant theory of metaphor 
treats metaphor as abbreviated simile. However, this theory 
does not acknowledge the embodied nature of metaphor, nor 
does it acknowledge that a metaphor has individual and influen-
tial meanings beyond the literal meanings of its constituents. In 
this essay, we explore this critique and discuss its relevance for 
understanding new concept formation. 
 The use of  elaborate analogy, thought-experiment, and other metaphor-like tools in philosophy of  mind is intriguing. In the past thirty years, philosophers of  sci-
ence, philosophers of  language, and cognitive 
scientists have emphasized the importance 
of  understanding metaphor, although they 
rarely agree on the role it plays in thought. In 
our research we found multiple theories of  
metaphor formation and meaning modifi-
cation. This essay is an exploration of  the 
status of  metaphors, particularly in science: 
what they are, how they work, what they tell 
us about science. In the following sections, 
we will concentrate on providing a general 
explanation of  metaphors by drawing on 
Lakoff  and Johnson’s model. Then we will 
confront the problems with the “metaphor as 
abbreviated simile” theory and conclude that 
the most informative theory of  metaphor will 
acknowledge that metaphors are capable of  
modifying meaning.
Regardless of  position, there are a few 
features of  metaphor that theorists agree on. 
First, metaphors play a deviant role in lan-
guage: “In the utterance of  a fresh metaphor 
the speaker explicitly violates the conven-
tional expectations of  the community.”1 The 
words or phrases used in a metaphor are em-
ployed outside of  their literal use. Secondly, 
metaphors are about “applying information 
and understandings from one domain of  
experience, which we call the source domain, to 
enhance understanding of  another domain 
called the target domain, that is typically more 
abstract.”2 Whether or not meaning is trans-
ferred across domains is a point of  conten-
tion in theories of  metaphor. In the following 
sections, we will argue that a shift in meaning 
is a more plausible theory, given the apparent 
role of  metaphor in science.
Metaphors are used widely in science to 
facilitate both communication and conceptual 
understanding amongst scientists and to the 
non-scientific public. From ancient models 
of  the atom, to the concept of  protein fold-
ing and global warming, scientists rely on 
complex metaphors to further their research 
and understanding.3 Metaphors are not used 
merely for convenience, but out of  necessity. 
It is important to acknowledge the signifi-
cant role of  metaphor in scientific thought 
because of  the impact it has on thought in 
general. There are cases in which scientists 
can only express new concepts, even to them-
selves, by way of  metaphor. For example, 
when William Harvey proposed a solution to 
the mystery of  how such a high volume of  
blood was pumped by the heart, he com-
pared (what we now know as) the circulatory 
system to a circle.4 That is, the metaphor of  
blood circulation as a circle helped clarify and 
modify important concepts in physiology, 
and directly contributed to the process of  de-
veloping a coherent explanatory concept (the 
term “circulatory system” is now ubiquitous). 
This shows that the meanings of  meta-
phors are understood apart from the literal 
meanings of  any of  the words in them. The 
circulatory system is not literally a circle and a 
system; the metaphor conveys more than this. 
The metaphor is useful precisely because it 
does not simply refer to the exact meaning of  
the literal words. Instead, by highlighting pos-
sible relevant aspects of  the source domain, 
it introduces a new way of  understanding the 
target domain, which otherwise would have 
remained obscure. This is directly contrary 
to the positivist idea is that “all scientific 
descriptions are purely literal” and concurs 
with the idea of  a general degradation of  the 
distinction between literal and metaphori-
cal meaning.5 As shown in the example, by 
altering existing concepts and adding depth 
of  meaning to new concepts, metaphors can 
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(and do) help the conceptual problem-solving 
process of  scientists. Scientists use meta-
phors to interpret data and new phenomena. 
“In themselves the data tell us nothing; only 
through the agency of  models and theories 
can we convert raw observational data into 
something that makes sense.”6 In order to in-
terpret new information, we draw on ”deeply 
ingrained bodily and social experiences that 
already form the framework for dealing with 
life on a day-to-day basis.”7 In the above 
example, William Harvey drew on his knowl-
edge of  circles and systems and applied them 
to the body. 
These bodily and social experiences are 
formed early in life from sensorimotor inter-
actions with the world (things we experience 
through our bodies) and subjective experienc-
es and judgments (emotions and beliefs). The 
associations we form between these types of  
experiences form what are known as “pri-
mary metaphors.”8 An example of  a primary 
metaphor is “Affection is Warmth.” This 
arises from the conflation of  the sensorimo-
tor experience of  warmth, and a subjective 
judgment of  affection. An infant conflates 
formation about the more complex metaphor. 
We can use this complex metaphor as a model 
for understanding elements of  relationships: 
How fast are the travelers going? Where are 
they going? Where are they stopping along 
the way? What else do they have planned? 
There are numerous ways complex metaphors 
inform our understanding of  the world. 
Primary metaphors make up a large degree 
of  our language; they are difficult to separate 
from speech because they are integrated into 
the structure of  everyday experience. From 
infancy we create associations grounded in 
physical and subjective experience that frame 
our experience in the world. We anchor our 
understanding in the metaphors we create. 
Without them, it is difficult to function at a 
high level of  reasoning; our understanding of  
the world is handicapped. Metaphor is a fun-
damental component of  thought. Although 
Lakoff  and Johnson acknowledge that 
thought can take place without metaphorical 
concepts, “such reasoning would never cap-
ture the full inferential capacity of  complex 
metaphorical thought.”11 Thus in order to 
reason abstractly, metaphor is needed. The 
Thus metaphor as simile presupposes two 
things: first, that the two linked domains/
words, taken “literally,”13 have at least one 
common element between them; second, 
that the metaphor does not alter or change 
the meaning of  any of  the words involved. 
The presuppositions of  the simile approach 
do not allow for metaphor to execute its role 
concerning novel concept formation in sci-
ence, and thus it is ruled out as an accurate 
characterization of  metaphor, its meaning, 
and its function. 
The reason for the first presupposition is 
obvious: to highlight a commonality, there 
must be a commonality in the first place. The 
second presupposition follows from the na-
ture of  “highlighting”; if  you are simply high-
lighting a commonality between two things, 
you are drawing attention to it, so it will be 
more readily noticed. But, other than the at-
tention being focused differently, the words 
still mean what they always mean. When 
metaphor is understood simply as simile, one 
must make due only with the literal mean-
ings of  words. Otherwise, the metaphor takes 
on new meaning beyond the literal. This is 
similar to another view which holds that, in 
a metaphor, words mean simply what they 
mean, and all a metaphor does is provoke 
some reaction in the listener.14 In this view, a 
metaphor is a set of  words that produce an 
unusual effect.
If  one accepts the abbreviated simile 
view or the alternative view of  metaphor 
mentioned above, one must then find some 
way of  accounting for the seeming indispens-
ability of  metaphoric meaning shifts in scientific 
thought and concept formation. Metaphoric 
meaning shifts take place when, in the con-
text of  the metaphor, meaning moves from 
one domain to the other. Accounting for 
this shift is no easy task, especially consider-
ing the insights of  cognitive science on the 
nature of  metaphor. In addition, the ab-
breviated simile view of  metaphor does not 
account for novel metaphor use.
Earlier we said the first presupposition 
of  the abbreviated simile view of  metaphor 
is some commonality between the literal 
meanings of  the two words. It is this com-
monality that a metaphor is supposed to 
bring out. Consider the case in which two 
words’ literal meanings have no commonali-
ties. For example, before blood was known to 
circulate around the body, the phrase “blood 
vessel” did not include the idea of  “pas-
sage of  fluid.”15 But one could say (during 
this pre-circulatory time), “Blood vessels 
are irrigation canals for the body,” which is 
a perfectly acceptable metaphor because it 
introduces a new ideas that the phrase “blood 
vessel” could come to include. The similarity 
between the two main ideas—blood vessel 
and irrigation canal—is at least going to in-
clude the idea of  “passage of  fluid.” But this 
similarity is not something that existed before 
the metaphor! The concept of  “blood vessel” 
can undergo modification (i.e. inclusion of  
“passage of  fluid”) as a result of the metaphor; 
there is a shift in the meaning. In the context 
of  the metaphor, the target domain takes on 
some qualities of  the source domain. The 
metaphor, target, and source domains can 
all shift in meaning. It is this modification 
that leads to the importance of  metaphor for 
science; new concepts cannot be understood 
without adequate metaphors. It is this modi-
fication that is precluded by the simile and 
related approaches.
Some may raise the objection that this 
similarity did in fact exist before the meta-
phor was made. Or, some may say that the 
person who uttered the metaphor first found 
the similarity, and thus uttered the metaphor 
as an abbreviated simile. In response to the 
first objection, we point out that there is a 
distinction between similarity in objects or 
referents on one hand, and the meaning of  a 
word on the other. In response to the second, 
we will clarify what constitutes a word’s literal 
meaning. We will address both of  these ob-
jections in the following paragraphs.
First, though a blood vessel and an irriga-
tion canal may both include the “passage of  
fluid” in their actual, physical operation, the 
meaning of  “blood vessel” did not include 
“passage of  fluid” before someone con-
nected the two. To argue otherwise implies 
the meaning of  a word is dependent wholly 
on the actual object and not on the knowl-
edge of  the speaker. This would mean there 
are times when we speak with words full of  
unrealized truth, and thus do not know the 
meaning of  what we speak. One would not 
know what “blood vessel” (or any word) re-
ally meant until one knew everything about it, 
yet this everything is what would be spoken at 
all times! This is a strange and counterintui-
tive view. To us, the departure this view takes 
from common intuition and the difficulties 
it creates for epistemology is enough reason 
to abandon it; it is much more likely that the 
meaning of  “blood vessel” did not include 
“passage of  fluid,” while the passage of  fluid 
was not attributed to blood vessels. 
This point segues nicely into the response 
to the second objection about our response 
to a person determining the similarity before 
uttering the metaphor. A metaphor, like all 
words and phrases, is uttered and has mean-
ing in a community of  language users. The 
literal meaning (or dictionary definition) of  
a word is derived from the standard use in a 
community of  language users. One person 
We anchor our understanding in the meta-
phors we create. Without them, it is difficult 
to function at a high level of reasoning; our 
understanding of the world is handicapped.
the warmth of  being held and the affection 
of  a parent. Later, we differentiate the two as-
pects but are able to reapply them metaphori-
cally, such as in the case of  the phrase “warm 
smile.”9 By combining primary metaphors, we 
create complex metaphors, which we then use 
to reason about the world. For example, take 
the complex metaphor “A Purposeful Life 
is a Journey”: when we break it down into 
its primary metaphors we get “Purposes are 
Destinations” and “Actions are Motions.”10 
Each of  these primary metaphors gives us in-
complexities of  thought, including scientific 
thought, could not be reached without the 
use of  metaphor.
One common and dominant view of  
metaphor is metaphor as abbreviated simile. 
Under this view, “The result of  a metaphoric 
interpretation will be the similarities that 
are both important and noticeable between 
distinct objects.”12 The task of  a simile is to 
bring out particular commonalities between 
two domains or objects, not to instigate a 
shift or change in meaning in any terms. 
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can introduce deviations in meaning—and 
these generally at a particular time—but 
cannot instantly alter the literal meaning of  
a word for the larger community. When the 
phrase “blood vessels are irrigation canals for 
the body” is uttered to unsuspecting mem-
bers of  the community, the literal meaning of  
blood vessels still does not include the notion 
of  “passage of  fluid.” Thus the similarity 
is not yet embodied in (literal) meaning (as 
required by abbreviated simile), and yet the 
metaphor holds. The metaphor is still expres-
sive of  some meaning beyond the known 
similarities. For a perhaps clearer example:
William Harvey raised the following 
problem: How could the heart pump out 
more blood in the space of  one hour than 
the weight of  a person? Only through 
the metaphor of  the blood’s movement 
in terms of  a circle could Harvey explain 
how the blood went through the body 
at such a high rate. This hypothesis of  
continual circulation required a significant 
reformulation of  the concept of  move-
ment of  blood.16 
This metaphor of  “circular movement” to 
“movement of  blood” was applicable and 
meaningful in a way that cannot be captured 
by simile, because the relevant similarities 
that the simile purports to expose are not 
known or understood. The meaning of  a 
metaphor must be derived from somewhere 
else. Properties seem to be transferred, in a 
semantic sense, from the source domain (ex. 
irrigation canals) to the target domain (ex. 
blood vessels).
To discuss an alternate theory, as opposed 
to metaphor taken to be an abbreviated 
simile, in this theory a metaphor genuinely 
has meaning beyond the literal meanings of  
its constituents; it does more than highlight 
similarities within the concepts. A metaphor’s 
meaning is an amalgam of  the two or more 
words or ideas present in the statement. This 
meaning alteration can go both ways, with 
both domains taking on new meaning, or it 
can be unidirectional, with the target domain 
taking on qualities of  the source domain. In 
both cases, the metaphor generally requires 
the fields of  comparison to be mutually ex-
clusive. This means relevant aspects of  each 
domain are highlighted, while other aspects 
are left out.17 As a result, those who use the 
metaphor will be influenced by it—they see 
through the lens of  the metaphor, so to say.18 
source domain of  the metaphor comes from 
the body’s sensorimotor system. Finally, the 
correlation is instantiated in the body via 
neural connections.”20 Understanding that 
metaphor as essentially linked to our em-
bodied experience opens up the potential for 
new classes of  metaphors. As we encounter 
When individuals are trying to express something 
new (whether it be in science or poetry), metaphor 
lends itself to this endeavor because it can forge 
links between things that did not previously exist. 
The metaphor takes on a certain power to 
dictate conceptual understanding.
Instead of  bringing out similarities in 
ideas, a metaphor applies aspects of  the 
semantics of  one idea (generally the source 
domain) to the semantics of  the other idea 
(generally the target domain) by either addi-
tion or replacement.19 Thus the target domain 
is now characterized by semantic elements it 
is usually not characterized by, and the fruit-
fulness of  such an alteration (determined by 
interacting with the object [referent] of  the 
target domain) will determine the power of  
the metaphor. For example, when aspects of  
“circular movement” were added to “move-
ment of  blood,” that alteration in “movement 
of  blood” proved to have great fruitfulness in 
explanatory and problem-solving situations. 
And so, metaphors begin to move from their 
role in concept alteration to the assimilation 
into the grammar of  a language.
It is important to acknowledge the signifi-
cant role of  metaphor in scientific thought 
because of  the impact it has on thought 
in general. We cannot build up to abstract 
thought without primary metaphors. An im-
portant implication of  the primary metaphor 
theory is that it demonstrates metaphor is 
embodied in three ways. In metaphor, the 
“correlation arises out of  our embodied 
functioning in the world . . . Second, the 
new sensorimotor or subjective experiences 
or judgments, we can create new primary 
metaphors, which could lead to the creation 
of  new concepts and ideas and then to new 
stages of  a language. This cannot happen 
if  we accept the simile theory of  metaphor 
because it does not allow for new meaning 
creation through metaphor.
Conclusion
In accepting the position of  metaphors as 
capable of  modifying meaning, we have 
demonstrated that metaphors are not second-
ary to literal meaning; they are distinct from 
literal meanings of  words. Metaphors can 
act on the involved domains in order to alter 
and refine established concepts and poten-
tially generate new concepts. This linking and 
altering of  concepts, in conjunction with the 
theory of  primary metaphors, suggests that 
metaphor is an early and primary component 
of  new concept formation. When individuals 
are trying to express something new (whether 
it be in science or poetry), metaphor lends 
itself  to this endeavor because it can forge 
links between things that did not previously 
exist. The expressive power of  metaphor runs 
deep. It is how individuals utter what they feel 
yet cannot say. It is at once an expression of  
links beyond words and also the first step to 
introducing new elements into linguistic life.
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